On Crenshaw

'Intersectional subordination need not be intentionally produced'

In her pioneering account of intersectionality, critical race theorist and activist Kimberlé Crenshaw proposed intersectionality as an account of intra-group difference, a way of 'mediating the tension between multiple identities and the necessity of group politics.' Different from antiessentialism, intersectionality recognises the significance of socially constructed categories and sees categorization as more than a one-way exercise of power. The problem for Crenshaw resides not in the existence of categories per se but rather in the particular values attached to them and the way those values create social hierarchies and strategic silences, sometimes unintentionally. For her, recognising the ways in which the intersectional experience of women of colour (woc) are marginalised in prevailing conceptions of identity politics does not require that we give up attempts to organise, but rather provides a basis for reconceptualising race and gender.

Because intersectional subordination is frequently the consequence of the imposition of one burden that interacts with pre-existing vulnerabilities, it can be 'unintentionally' produced, as is the case with gender-based policies for addressing physical violence against women. By missing on other dimensions of their identities such as race or class, gender-based policies tend to ignore woc experiences, further contributing to tensions among groups. By mistakenly equalising when trying to break exclusivity, these policies change the focus from those who suffer the most to white middle class women. As Crenshaw brilliantly argues, the problem is not simply that the women who dominate the antiviolence movement are different from woc, but that they frequently have power to determine, either through material or rhetorical resources, whether the intersecrtional differences of woc are incorporated at all into the basic formulation of policy.

For example, violence is disregarded when the home is 'othered,' and the problem is only politicised when it is seen to happen in the dominant community. Focusing on making 'minority' majority problems precludes any authentic and sensitive attention to the experiences of woc. And, on the other hand, tokenistic, objectifying, voyeuristic inclusion is just as disempowering as outright exclusion. Crenshaw was able to see that although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. For this reason, the primary beneficiaries of policies supported by feminists tend to be white women, while the primary beneficiaries of the antiracist practices tend to be black men. But, for example, black women are more likely to be raped than black men to be falsely accused of rape. By focusing the racism and rape debate in terms of differential access of men rather than the differential protection of women, black women are considered victims of discrimination only to the extent that white men can rape them without fear of significant punishment, rather than being viewed as victims of discrimination on their own right. As Crenshaw puts it, woc 'need not await the ultimate the ultimate triumph over racism before they can expect to live violence-free lives.'

Another way intersectional subordination need not be intentionally produced related to the limits of the liberal account of justice, for which the liberatory objective should be to empty categories of any social significance (no easy task!) rather than understanding how power asymmetries work and embracing a complex notion of identity and the positionality of knowledge. To Crenshaw, the social power in delineating difference need not be the power of domination, it can instead be the source of social empowerment and reconstruction. Liberal justice's laws, even if not particularistic on their own terms, can reinforce already existing inequalities of oppression.

Crenshaw's account of intersectionality is a complex and layered one which accounts for structural -different qualitative experiences of domestic violence, rape, etc. - political - marginalisation of issues by both feminist and antiracist organisations - and representational - the externally-imposed cultural construction of woc- subordination. But three main questions remain. First, there is an inherent ambiguity in the definition of intersectionality that can complicate its operationalization, making it harder to understand and resolve this 'unintentional' oppression. The lack of a clear intersectional research methodology has sometimes been tackled through methodological pluralism, but still remains a challenge. Second, there is a mobilisational question for the activist: .how is global sisterhood/blackhood still possible with such crucial intra-group differences? Spivak's strategic essentialism may be a possible response. Last but not least, Crenshaw places a disproportionate (but fair enough considering history) focus on the black women, but how does intersectionality pay out in other social identities? The writings of Moraga and Anzaldúa can provide a starting point.